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WHERE IS THE "THERE" IN HEALTH
LAW? CAN IT BECOME A COHERENT
FIELD?
Mark A. Hall'
CarlE. Schneider+
GERTRUDE STEIN COMPLAINED OF OAKLAND, "There
is no there there."' Churchill complained of his pudding that "it has
no theme."2 And everybody complains of health law that it lacks an
organizing principle. Health law scholars bemoan the "pathologies"
"paradigms ' 4
of health law 3 and its contradictory and competing
5
which form a "chaotic, dysfunctional patchwork.",
But it should not surprise us that any field which grows by accretion lacks a unifying idea or animating concern. And health law certainly grew by accretion. It began in the 1960s, when the LawFred D. and Elizabeth L. Turnage Professor, Wake Forest University.
Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law and Professor Internal Medicine,
University of Michigan.

1 GERTRUDE STEIN,

EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY

289 (Cooper Square

Publishers 1976) (1937).
2 Conversation between Winston Churchill and a waiter at the
Savoy Hotel,
in LORD HOME,THE WAY THE WIND BLOWS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 217 (1976).
3 Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449,
1452 (1994) (arguing that health law suffers from the pathology of applying its four
different paradigms inconsistently).
4 Various discussions on health law's different intellectual paradigms can be
found in TASK FORCE ON HEALTH LAW CURRICULA, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF LAW AND
MEDICINE, HEALTH LAW AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (1985) (outlining a comprehensive framework and organization of the field); George J. Annas, Health Law at the
Turn of the Century: From White Dwarfto Red Giant, 21 CONN.L. REV. 551 (1989)
(proposing an paradigm for health law focused on social justice, bioethics, and public
health); M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 249 (2003)
(arguing that health law is both chaotic and unruly); Elhague, supra note 3; Clark C.
Havighurst, The ProfessionalParadigmof Medical Care: Obstacle to Decentralization, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415 (1990) (criticizing the professional paradigm); Rand E.
Rosenblatt, ConceptualizingHealth Lawfor Teaching Purposes: The Social Justice
Perspective,38 J.LEGAL EDUC. 489 (1988) (summarizing different approaches to
health law); Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigmsin Bioethics andHealth Law: The
Rise of a New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 408-14 (1994) (analyzing the
shifting paradigms in health law and critiquing economic rationality as an organizing
principle).
5 Bloche, supra note 4, at 321.
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Medicine Center was established, concerned with medical proof in
litigation, physicians' malpractice, and public-health regulation. During the 1970s, bioethics was taken into the fold. And in the 1980s,
economic and regulatory topics gained prominence in the field.
Health law, then, is more the creature of history than of systematic
and conceptual organization. It looks hardly more cohesive than a
"law of horses." As Judge Easterbrook once quipped about cyberlaw:
"Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people
kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of
horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at
horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on 'The
Law of the Horse' is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles." 6
This is not to say that there have been no attempts to give health
law the dignity of an explaining principle. Medical law has in recent
years entertained two competing paradigms - the patients' rights approach and the law and economics approach. The patients' rights
approach at heart hopes that medicine can be regulated by endowing
patients with rights of autonomy to which medical professionals and
institutions must defer. The law and economics approach at heart
hopes that medicine can be regulated in the market, by consumers
making purchasing decisions that discipline medical institutions.
Both these approaches have their merits. Not least, both have
helped temper the tendency of medicine to exalt its guild interests and
have helped put the patient at the center of the law's concerns. Nevertheless, there is today discontent with both paradigms. Few people
suppose that markets can solve all problems, and many people doubt
that the medical marketplace can ever work really well. Furthermore,
the law and economics paradigm offends the political sensibilities of
many scholars who write in the area. The patients' rights view has
enamored academics, but today even many academics are beginning
to feel that that view is bumping against the point of diminishing returns. In addition, while both the patients' rights and the law and economics approaches put the patient at the center of their universe, they
imagine a patient who does not exist. The patients' rights approach
imagines patients vigorously exercising and protecting their autonomy
in order to pursue unique "life plans." The law and economics approach imagines consumers making purchasing decisions based on a
well-developed understanding of what they want and what the mar-
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Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U.
1996, at 207.
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kets offer. Crucially, however, real patients are little like either of
these stick figures.
We suspect there is no grand organizing principle for medical law
because there cannot be. Medical law deals with medical activities in
too many settings and must borrow from too many areas of law. Nevertheless, we believe medical law can adopt a more useful analytical
perspective, one that tends to distinguish it from other areas of law.
We propose an analytical framework that views health care law as a
law of relational webs rather than a law of transactions.
A transactional perspective takes the atomistic view that each
medical encounter is a discrete event rather than part of an on-going
web of relationships. A relational web perspective, on the other hand,
views medical encounters more holistically, as part of a larger context
formed by the parties' interactions with each other and their relationships with other individuals and institutions. For example, informed
consent law essentially requires separate consent for each component
of service within an illness (invasive testing, surgery, pharmaceuticals, etc.). A relational perspective, on the other hand, views medical
encounters more holistically, as part of a larger context formed by the
parties' interactions. For example, the law recognizes patients' dependence by structuring the duty to treat around episodes of illness
and preventing physicians from unilaterally dropping a sick patient
without either the patient's permission or enough notice to give the
patient time to find another doctor.
The transactional perspective grows out of the fact that medical
law generally has not answered its basic questions by developing a set
of doctrines specific to its subject. Rather, it has treated medicine as a
business virtually like any other, and it has drawn its doctrines from
the many fields of law that govern ordinary commercial affairs. But
business law abstracts. It is disinclined to search out the particular
aspects of each business that might make it different from other businesses and relies instead on generalizations about how all business
works and should work. Law sometimes considers the ways medicine
is a business that poses special problems, but other times it does not.
And it rarely asks which approach is preferable. In short, medical law
plucks from the web of life individual transactions and treats them as
discrete events. But because medical law thus analyzes events in isolation from their context, it repeatedly misunderstands those events
and assigns inappropriate legal consequences to them. Medical law
thus condemns itself to operate at a fatal remove from reality.
All this becomes clearer when we understand the reality that a
transactional approach ignores. First, real patients live their lives embedded in a web of relationships and personal histories that shape
their thought and behavior in ways not easily incorporated by a trans-
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actional model. Little in the lives of most people makes them the enthusiastic and skilled decision-makers that transactional law often
imagines.7 And insofar as patients think about themselves in medical
contexts, they think-we suspect-primarily in non-transactional
terms. They think that, at its heart, health care is about a relationship-the relationship between doctor and patient-that is in its essence and at its best not a legal relationship. Instead, it is a relationship which in some ways is damaged by being considered in transactional legal terms. In this way it resembles another institution generally apt for legal regulation: marriage, a relationship in which trust is
crucial and personal relations are central.8
Second, real patients not only live in a web of relationships with
their friends, families, and physicians that affect the way they act as
rights-holders and as consumers. They also have web-like relationships with various medical institutions. Doctors organize into practice
groups and refer patients to specialists and clinics. When patients are
sicker, they enter hospitals and other complex parts of the health care
enterprise. Furthermore, patients have increasingly elaborate financial
and treatment relationships with health insurers. And, important decisions about insurance are frequently made through employers.
Unfortunately, the law tends to view each of these relationships as
bilateral and one dimensional, rather than as part of a complex web of
relationships. For instance, courts that adjudicate disputes over insurance coverage often fail to see that decisions about medical necessity
for insurance purposes might also affect physicians' standard of care
under liability law. 9 Also, because law operates at a level of abstraction, it ignores a good deal about the circumstances of medical personnel and institutions by assuming they respond in predictable ways
to a narrow range of stimuli.
In sum, considering the psychological reality of treatment encounters and the complex structure of relationships among patients, physicians, facilities, insurers, employers, and many others, we need a law
of relationships that accommodates the unique features of the medical
arena, not a set of generic or abstract legal principles derived largely
7
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CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS,

(1998) (examining whether patients actually want
the responsibility of making medical decisions for themselves and whether they have
the ability to do so effectively).
DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS

8 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 477

(2002).

9 See William M. Sage, Managed Care'sCrimea: Medical Necessity,
Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals ofAdministrative Process in Health Insurance,
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
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from commercial law or the law of individual rights. That law of relationships must be based on a view of the world as it actually is, of
people and institutions as they actually are. Not least, that law must
recognize the status of patients and the psychological and emotional
vulnerabilities entailed in seeking medical care.
So what is to be done? Lawmakers need to be alert to the choice
between transactional and relational perspectives in medical law.
Examples of each can be found sporadically in judicial decisions,
statutory and regulatory authorities, and academic commentary, but
these choices are usually made without reflection. Therefore, no consistent pattern has emerged, and the choices are often ill advised (in
both directions). In short, some areas may benefit from being less
transactional, while others may need to remain primarily transactional,
or become less relational. An analytical framework is needed to identify the important issues and provide conceptual tools for deliberation
and resolution.
If lawmakers are to make wise choices about when to proceed
transactionally and when to proceed relationally, they will need to
understand better than they do how the world actually works. And
crucially that will be possible only if scholars are willing to do what
they have been promising to do since the legal realists--empirical
research. Indeed, even if courts and legislatures persist in an implacably transactional approach, the malign effects of that approach will be
considerably ameliorated if the nature of the transactions and the effects of legal regulation of them are better understood. Only in this
way will medical-law scholars and lawmakers realize just how often
the world works in unanticipated ways that keep law from achieving
its purposes.
The search for a general theory of medical law is the search for a
chimera. But scholars of medical law can usefully unite in a shared
analytical framework-one that brings more rigor to the intuition that
medicine differs in fundamental ways from other social and business
arenas. Doing so will generate conceptual and empirical tools for
deciding whether and when these special qualities should matter for
the law and when they should not. In sum, we may find medical law's
"there" not in grander principles but in a wiser method.

